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Abstract The paper deals with a class of parametrized equilibrium problems, where the objectives of the
players do possess nonsmooth terms. The respective Nash equilibria can be characterized via a parameter-
dependent variational inequality of the second kind, whose Lipschitzian stability is thoroughly investigated.
This theory is then applied to evolution of a oligopolistic market in which the firms adopt their production
strategies to changing input costs, while each change of the production is associated with some ”costs of
change”. We examine both the Cournot-Nash equilibria as well as the two-level case, when one firm decides
to take over the role of the Leader (Stackelberg equilibrium). The impact of costs of change is illustrated by
academic examples.
Keywords Generalized equation · Equilibrium · Cost of Change
1 Introduction
Consider an oligopolistic market, where the data of the production cost functions and constraints of each
producer/firm are available to all his rivals. In such a case each producer can compute his optimal non-
cooperative Cournot-Nash strategy by solving the corresponding variational inequality, see [13] and [14]. It
may happen, however, that in the course of time some external parameters change, e.g., the prices of the
inputs or the parameters of the inverse demand function describing the behavior of the customers. In such a
case, the strategies should be adjusted but, as thoroughly analyzed in [6], each change is generally associated
with some expenses, called costs of change. Thus, given a certain initial strategy profile (productions of all
firms), we face then a different equilibrium model, in which the costs of change enter the objectives of some
(or all) producers. Since these costs are typically nonsmooth, the respective variational inequality, describing
the new non-cooperative equilibrium, becomes substantially more complicated, both from the theoretical as
well as from the numerical point of view. One can imagine that such updates of strategies are performed
repetitively. This leads to a discrete-time evolution process, where the firms respond to changing conditions
by repetitive solution of the mentioned rather complicated variational inequality (with updated data). As
discussed in [14, Chapter 12], it may also happen that one of the producers, having an advantage over the
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others, takes over the role of a Leader and switches to the Stackelberg strategy, whereas the remaining firms
continue to play non-cooperatively with each other on the lower level as Followers. In this case, our discrete-
time evolution process, considered from the point of view of the Leader, amounts to repetitive solution of
mathematical programs with equilibrium constraints (MPECs) with a nonsmooth objective and the above
mentioned variational inequality among the constraints. Further, it is interesting to note that the above
described model has, in case of positively homogeneous costs of change, a similar structure as some infinite-
dimensional variational systems used in continuum mechanics to model a class of rate-independent processes
cf., e.g., [12] or [7].
The plan of the paper is as follows. In the preliminary Section 2 we collect the necessary background
from variational analysis. Section 3 consists of two parts. In the first one we introduce a general parameter-
dependent non-cooperative equilibrium problem which is later used for modeling of the considered oligopolis-
tic market. By employing standard arguments, existence of the respective solutions (equilibria) is shown. In
the second part we then consider a parameter-dependent variational system which encompasses the men-
tioned equilibrium problem and is amenable to advanced tools of variational analysis. In this way one obtains
useful stability results concerning the respective solution map. They are used in the sequel but they are also
important for its own sake.
Thereafter, in Section 4, this equilibrium problem is specialized to a form, corresponding to the oligopolis-
tic market model from [13]. In this case, the solution map is even single-valued and locally Lipschitzian. In
Section 5 we then consider a modification of the 5-firm example from [13] with the aim to illustrate the role
of costs of change and to describe a possible numerical approach to the computation of the respective equi-
libria. Whereas Section 5.1 deals with noncooperative Cournot-Nash equilibrium, Section 5.2 concerns the
situation, when one of the firms prefers to apply the Stackelberg strategy. In both cases our main numerical
tool is the so-called Gauss-Seidel method from [10] tailored to the considered type of problems.
The following notation is employed. Given a vector x ∈ Rn, [x] denotes the linear subspace generated by
x and [x]⊥stands for its orthogonal complement. For a multifunction F : Rn ⇒ Rm, gphF signifies the graph
of F , δA is the indicatory function of a set A and R = R ∪ {+∞} is the extended real line. B stands for the
unit ball and, for a cone K, K◦ denotes its (negative) polar.
2 Background from variational analysis
Throughout the whole paper, we will make an extensive use of the following basic notions of modern varia-
tional analysis.
Definition 1 Let A be a closed set in Rn and x¯ ∈ A. Then
TA(x¯) := Lim sup
t↘0
A− x¯
t
is the tangent (contingent, Bouligand) cone to A at x¯,
N̂A(x¯) := (TA(x¯))
◦
is regular (Fre´chet) normal cone to A at x¯, and
NA(x¯) := Lim sup
A
x→x¯
N̂A(x) = {x∗|∃
A
x∗i → x∗, x∗i ∈ N̂A(xi) such that x∗i → x∗}
is the limiting (Mordukhovich) normal cone to A at x¯.
In this definition ”Lim sup” stands for the Painleve´-Kuratowski outer set limit. If A is convex, then N̂A(x¯) =
NA(x¯) amounts to the classical normal cone in the sense of convex analysis and we write NA(x¯).
In the sequel, we will also employ the co-called critical cone. In the setting of Definition 1 with an given
normal d∗ ∈ N̂A(x¯), the cone
KA(x¯, d∗) := TA(x¯) ∩ [d∗]⊥
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is called the critical cone to A at x¯ with respect to d∗.
The above listed cones enable us to describe the local behavior of set-valued maps via various generalized
derivatives. Consider a closed-graph multifunction F and the point (x¯, y¯) ∈ gphF .
Definition 2 (i) The multifunction DF (x¯, y¯) : Rn ⇒ Rm, defined by
DF (x¯, y¯)(u) := {v ∈ Rm|(u, v) ∈ TgphF (x¯, y¯)}, d ∈ Rn,
is called the graphical derivative of F at (x¯, y¯);
(ii) The multifunction D∗F (x¯, y¯) : Rm ⇒ Rn, defined by
D∗F (x¯, y¯)(v∗) := {u∗ ∈ Rn|(u∗,−v∗) ∈ NgphF (x¯, y¯)}, v∗ ∈ Rm,
is called the limiting (Mordukhovich) coderivative of F at (x¯, y¯).
Next we turn our attention to a proper convex, lower-semicontinuous (lsc) function q : Rn → R. Given
an x¯ ∈ dom q, by ∂q(x¯) we denote the classical Moreau-Rockafellar subdifferential of q at x¯. In this case, for
the subderivative function dq(x¯) : Rn → R ([17, Definition 8.1]) it holds that
dq(x¯)(w) = q′(x¯;w) := lim
τ↘0
q(x¯+ τw)− q(x¯)
τ
for all w ∈ Rn.
In Section 3 we will employ also second-order subdifferentials and second-order subderivatives of q.
Definition 3 Let v¯ ∈ ∂q(x¯). The multifunction ∂2q(x¯, v¯) : Rn ⇒ Rn defined by
∂2q(x¯, v¯)(v∗) := D∗∂q(x¯, v¯)(v∗), v∗ ∈ Rn,
is called the second-order subdifferential of q at (x¯, v¯).
If q is separable, i.e., q(x) =
n∑
i=1
qi(xi) with some proper convex, lsc functions qi : R→ R, then
∂2q(x¯, v¯)(v∗) =
 ∂
2q1(x¯1, v¯1)(v
∗
1)
...
∂2qn(x¯n, v¯n)(v
∗
n)
 ,
where v¯i, v
∗
i are the ith components of the vectors, v¯, v
∗, respectively.
Concerning second-order subderivatives ([17, Definition 13.3]), we confine ourselves to the case when q
is, in addition, piecewise linear-quadratic. This means that dom q can be represented as the union of finitely
many polyhedral sets, relative to each of which q(x) is given in the form 12 〈x,Ax〉+ 〈a, x〉+α for some scalar
α ∈ R, vector a ∈ Rn and a symmetric [n× n] matrix A, cf. [17, Definition 10.20].
In this particular case it has been proved in [17, Proposition 13.9] that, with v¯ ∈ ∂q(x¯) and w ∈ Rn the
second-order subderivative d2q(x¯|v¯) is proper convex and piecewise linear quadratic and
d2q(x¯|v¯)(w) = q′′(x¯;w) + δK(x¯,v¯)(w), (1)
where
q′′(x¯;w) := lim
τ↘0
q(x¯+ τw)− q(x¯)− τq′(x¯;w)
1
2τ
2
is the one-sided second directional derivative of q at x¯ in direction w and K(x¯, v¯) := {w|q′(x¯;w) = 〈v¯, w〉}.
For a general theory of second-order subderivatives (without our restrictive requirements) the interested
reader is referred to [17, Chapter 13 B].
We conclude now this section with the definitions of two important Lipschitzian stability notions for
multifunctions which will be extensively employed in the sequel.
Definition 4 Consider a multifunction S : Rm ⇒ Rn and a point (u¯, v¯) ∈ gphS.
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(i) S is said to have the Aubin property around (u¯, v¯), provided there are neighborhoods U of u¯, V of v¯ along
with a constant η ≥ 0 such that
S(u1) ∩ V ⊂ S(u2) + η‖u1 − u2‖B for all u1, u2 ∈ U .
(ii) We say that S has a single-valued and Lipschitzian localization around (u¯, v¯), provided there are neigh-
borhoods U of u¯, V of v¯ and a Lipschitzian mapping s : U → Rn such that s(u¯) = v¯ and
S(u) ∩ V = {s(u)} for all u ∈ U .
Further important stability notions can be found, e.g., in [4].
3 General equilibrium model: Existence and stability
Consider a non-cooperative game of l players, each of which solves the optimization problem
minimize fi(p, xi, x−i) + qi(xi)
subject to
xi ∈ Ai,
(2)
i = 1, 2, . . . , l. In (2), xi ∈ Rn is the strategy of the ith player,
x−i := (x1, . . . , xi−1, xi+1, . . . , xl) ∈ (Rn)l−1
is the strategy profile of the remaining players and p ∈ Rm is a parameter, common for all players. Further,
the functions
fi : Rm × (Rn)l → R and qi : Rn → R, i = 1, 2, . . . , l,
are continuously differentiable and convex continuous, respectively, and the sets of admissible strategies
Ai, i = 1, 2, . . . , l, are closed and convex. The objective in (2) is thus the sum of a smooth function depending
on the whole strategy profile x := (x1, x2, . . . , xl) and a convex (not necessarily smooth) function depending
only on xi. Let us recall that, given a parameter vector p¯, the strategy profile x¯ = (x¯1, x¯2, . . . , x¯l) is a
corresponding Nash equilibrium provided
x¯i ∈ arg min
xi∈Ai
[
fi(p¯, xi, x¯−i) + qi(xi)
]
for all i.
Denote by S : Rm ⇒ (Rn)l the solution mapping which assigns each p the corresponding (possibly empty)
set of Nash equilibria. The famous Nash Theorem [2, Theorem 12.2] yields the next statement.
Theorem 1 Given p¯ ∈ Rn, assume that
(A1) for all admissible values of x−i functions fi(p¯, ·, x−i), i = 1, 2, . . . , l, are convex, and
(A2) sets Ai, i = 1, 2, . . . , l, are bounded.
Then S(p¯) 6= ∅.
Suppose from now on that (A1) holds true for all p from an open set B ⊂ Rm. Then one has that B ⊂ domS
and for p ∈ B
S(p) = {x| 0 ∈ F (p, x) +Q(x)}, (3)
where
F (p, x) =
F1(p, x)...
Fl(p, x)
 with Fi(p, x) = ∇xifi(p, xi, x−i), i = 1, 2, . . . , l, and
Q(x) = ∂q˜(x) with q˜(x) =
l∑
i=1
q˜i(xi) and q˜i(xi) = qi(xi) + δA(xi), i = 1, 2, . . . , l.
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This follows immediately from the fact that under the posed assumptions the solution set of (2) is charac-
terized by the first-order condition
0 ∈ ∇xifi(p, xi, x−i) + ∂q˜i(xi), i = 1, 2, . . . , l.
Remark 1 The GE in (3) can be equivalently written down in the form:
For a given p¯ find x¯ such that
〈F (p¯, x¯), x− x¯〉+ q˜(x)− q˜(x¯) ≥ 0 for all x.
Our equilibrium is thus governed by a variational inequality (VI) of the second kind, cf. [11], [5, page 96].
Next we will concentrate on the (local) analysis of S (given by (3)) under the less restrictive assumptions
that, with s := ln,
(i) F : Rm × Rs → Rs is continuously differentiable, and
(ii) Q(·) = ∂q˜(·) for a proper convex, lsc function q˜ : Rs → R.
In this way, the obtained results will be applicable not only to the equilibrium problem stated above, but to
a broader class of parametrized VIs of the second kind. Note that stability of the generalized equation (GE)
0 ∈ F (p, x) + ∂q˜(x) (4)
has been investigated, among other works, in [17, Chapter 13] even without any convexity assumptions
imposed on q˜. As proved in [17, Theorem 13.48], S has the Aubin property around (p¯, x¯) ∈ gphS provided
the adjoint GE
0 ∈ ∇xF (p¯, x¯)Tu+ ∂2q˜(x¯,−F (p¯, x¯))(u) (5)
in variable u ∈ Rs has only the trivial solution u = 0.
This condition is automatically fulfilled provided ∇xF (p¯, x¯) is positive definite. Indeed, due to the as-
sumptions imposed on q˜, the mapping ∂q˜ is maximal monotone [17, Theorem 12.17]. We can thus invoke
[15, Theorem 2.1], according to which
〈u, v〉 ≥ 0 for all v ∈ ∂2q˜(x¯,−F (p¯, x¯))(u).
The result thus follows from the inequality
0 ≤ 〈u,∇xF (p¯, x¯)Tu〉.
Let us now derive conditions ensuring the existence of a single-valued and Lipschitzian localization of S
around (p¯, x¯). To this purpose we employ [4, Theorem 3G.4], according to which this property of S is implied
by the existence of a single-valued and Lipschitzian localization of the associated partially linearized mapping
Σ : Rs ⇒ Rs defined by
Σ(w) := {x|w ∈ F (p¯, x¯) +∇xF (p¯, x¯)(x− x¯) + ∂q˜(x)} (6)
around (0, x¯). This implication leads immediately to the next statement.
Proposition 1 Assume that ∇xF (p¯, x¯) is positive definite. Then S has a single-valued and Lipschitzian
localization around (p¯, x¯).
Proof Observe first that, by [17, Theorem 13.48], Σ has the Aubin property around (0, x¯) if and only if (5)
has only the trivial solution u = 0 which, in turn, is ensured by the positive definiteness of ∇xF (p¯, x¯). So
the assertion follows from [4, Theorem 3G.5] provided the mapping
Φ(x) := F (p¯, x¯) +∇xF (p¯, x¯)(x− x¯) + ∂q˜(x)
is locally monotone at (x¯, 0), i.e., for some neighborhood U of (x¯,−F (x¯)), one has
〈x′ − x,∇xF (p¯, x¯)(x′ − x)〉+ 〈x′ − x, y′ − y〉 ≥ 0 ∀ (x, y), (x′, y′) ∈ gph ∂q˜ ∩ U .
This holds trivially due to the posed assumptions and we are done. 
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In some situations the assumption of positive definiteness of ∇xF (p¯, x¯) can be weakened.
Proposition 2 Assume that q˜ is convex, piecewise linear-quadratic and the mapping
Ξ(w) := {k ∈ Rn|w ∈ ∇xF (p¯, x¯)k + ∂ϕ(k)} (7)
with ϕ(k) := 12d
2q˜(x¯| − F (p¯, x¯))(k) is single-valued on Rs. Then S has a single-valued and Lipschitzian
localization around (p¯, x¯).
Proof Again, by virtue of [4, Theorem 3G.4] it suffices to show that the single-valuedness of Ξ implies the
existence of a single-valued and Lipschitzian localization of Σ around (0, x¯). Clearly,
gphΣ =
{
(w, x)
∣∣∣∣∣
[
x− x¯
w −∇xF (p¯, x¯)(x− x¯)
]
∈ gph ∂q˜ −
[
x¯
− F (p¯, x¯)
]}
so that Σ is a polyhedral multifunction due to our assumptions imposed on q˜, cf. [17, Theorem 12.30]. It
follows from [16] (see also [14, Cor.2.5]) that due to the polyhedrality of Σ, it suffices to ensure the single-
valuedness of Σ(·)∩V on U , where U is a convex neighborhood of 0 ∈ Rs and V is a neighborhood of x¯. Let
us select these neighborhoods in such a way that
gph ∂q˜ −
[
x¯
− F (p¯, x¯)
]
= Tgph ∂q˜(x¯,−F (p¯, x¯)),
which is possible due to the polyhedrality of ∂q˜. Then one has
gphΣ ∩ (U × V) = {(w, x¯+ k) ∈ U × V|w ∈ ∇xF (p¯, x¯)k +D∂q˜(x¯,−F (p¯, x¯))(k)}.
Under the posed assumptions for any k ∈ Rn
D∂q˜(x¯,−F (p¯, x¯))(k) = ∂ϕ(k),
cf. [17, Theorem 13.40], so that gphΣ∩(U×V) = {(w, k+x¯) ∈ U×V|(w, k) ∈ gphΞ}. SinceD∂q˜(x¯,−F (p¯, x¯))(·)
is positively homogeneous, ∂ϕ(·) is positively homogeneous as well and so the single-valuedness of Σ(·) ∩ V
on U amounts exactly to the single-valuedness of Ξ on Rs. 
Note that, by virtue of [8, Theorem 4.4], in the setting of Proposition 2 one has
DS(p¯, x¯)(h) = {k|0 ∈ ∇pF (p¯, x¯)h+∇xF (p¯, x¯)k + ∂ϕ(k)} (8)
for all h ∈ Rm.
If q˜ = δA for a convex polyhedral setA, then ∂q˜(x) = NA(x) and, by virtue of (1), ϕ(k) = δKA(x¯,−F (p¯,x¯))(k).
It follows that the GE in (7) attains the form
w ∈ ∇xF (p¯, x¯)k +NKA(x¯,−F (p¯,x¯))(k).
This is in agreement with [14, Theorem 5.3] and [4, Theorem 4F.1]. Let us illustrate the general case of
Proposition 2 via a simple academic
Example 1 Put m = 2, l = 1, n = 1 and consider the GE (4), where F (p, x) = p1 + p2x, q˜(x) = |x| + δA(x)
with A = [0, 1] and the reference pair (p¯, x¯) = ((−1, 1), 0). Clearly, v¯ := −F (p¯, x¯) = 1, and we may again
employ formula (1). One has K(x¯, v¯) = R+, f ′′(x¯, w) = 0 for any w ∈ R+ and so we obtain that
ϕ(k) =
1
2
d2q˜(x¯| − F (p¯, x¯))(k) = δR+(k).
It follows that
Ξ(w) = {k|w ∈ k + ∂δR+(k)} = {k|w ∈ k + NR+(k)} = {k ≥ 0|k − w ≥ 0, 〈k, k − w〉 = 0}. (9)
Since Ξ is clearly single-valued on R, we may conclude that the respective S has indeed the single-valued
and Lipschitzian localization around (p¯, x¯). By virtue of (8)
DS(p¯, x¯)(h) = {k|0 ∈ h1 + k +NR+(k)}.
Both mappings S and DS(p¯, x¯) are depicted in Fig.1.
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Fig. 1 The set in equilibria S(p1, p2) (left) and the graphical derivative DS(p¯, x¯)(h1, h2) of Example 1.
In some cases one can apply the following criterion based on Proposition 2 and [17, Theorem 13.9].
Proposition 3 Assume that q˜ is convex, piecewise linear-quadratic, q˜′′(x¯; ·) is convex and, with
K := {k|q′(x¯; k) = 〈−F (p¯, x¯), k〉},
one has
∂
1
2
d2q˜(x¯| − F (p¯, x¯))(k) = ∂ 1
2
q˜′′(x¯; k) +NK(k).
Further suppose that the matrix ∇xF (p¯, x¯) is copositive with respect to K. Then S has a single-valued and
Lipschitzian localization around (p¯, x¯).
Proof We show that the assumptions of Proposition 2 are fulfilled. To this aim consider the quantity
V := 〈∇xF (p¯, x¯)(k1 − k2), k1 − k2〉+ 〈ξ1 − ξ2, k1 − k2〉+ 〈η1 − η2, k1 − k2〉
with ξ1 ∈ ∂ 12 q˜′′(x¯; k1), ξ2 ∈ ∂ 12 q˜′′(x¯; k2), η1 ∈ NK(k1) and η2 ∈ NK(k2). It follows that k1, k2 ∈ K so that, by
the imposed assumptions, there is a σ > 0 such that V ≥ σ‖k1− k2‖2. Hence the operator on the right-hand
side of
ξ ∈ ∇xF (p¯, x¯)k + ∂ 1
2
[q˜′′(x¯; k)] +NK(k).
is strongly monotone. This implies, by virtue of [17, Proposition 12.54], the single-valuedness of the respective
mapping Ξ and we are done. 
4 Optimal strategies of producers
As stated in the Introduction, our motivation for a study of mapping (3) came from an attempt to optimize
the production strategies of firms with respect to changing external parameters like input prices, parameters
of inverse demand functions etc. These parameters evolve in time and the corresponding adjustments of
production strategies have (at least at some producers) to take into account the already mentioned costs of
change. The appropriate variant of the GE in (3) (depending on the considered type of market) has thus
to be solved at each time step with the updated values of the parameters. In this section we will analyze
from this point of view a standard oligopolistic market described thoroughly in [13] and in [14, Chapter
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12]. So, in the framework (2) we will assume that n is the number of produced homogeneous commodities,
p = (p1, p2) ∈ Rm1 × Rm2 ,m1 +m2 = m and
fi(p, xi, x−i) = ci(p1, xi)− 〈xi, pi(p2, T )〉 (10)
with T =
l∑
i=1
xi. Functions ci : Rm1 × Rn → R represent the production costs of the ith producer and
pi : Rm2 × Rn → R is the inverse demand function which assigns each value of the parameter p2 and
the overall production vector T the price at which the (price-taking) consumers are willing to demand.
Additionally, we assume that, with some non-negative reals βi,
qi(xi) = βi‖xi − ai‖, i = 1, 2, . . . , l, (11)
where || · || stands for an arbitrary norm in Rn. Sets Ai ⊂ Rn specify the sets of feasible productions and
functions qi represent the costs of change associated with the change of production from a given vector ai
to xi. Thus
ai ∈ Ai, i = 1, 2, . . . , l,
are ”previous” productions which have to be changed taking into account the ”new” values of parameters
p1, p2. Clearly, one could definitely work also with more complicated functions qi. Let us denote the total
costs (negative profits) of the single firms by
Ji(p, xi, x−i) := fi(p, xi, x−i) + qi(xi), i = 1, 2, . . . , l.
In accordance with [13] and [14] we will now assume for brevity that n = 1 (so that s = l) and impose the
following assumptions:
(S1) ∃ an open set B1 ⊂ Rm1 and open sets Di ⊃ Ai such that for for i = 1, 2, . . . , l
– ci are twice continuously differentiable on B1 ×Di;
– ci(p1, ·) are convex for all p1 ∈ B1.
(S2) ∃ an open set B2 ⊂ Rm2 such that
– pi is twice continuously differentiable on B2 × intR+;
– ϑpi(p2, ϑ) is a concave function of ϑ for all p2 ∈ B2.
(S3) Sets Ai ⊂ R+ are closed bounded intervals and at least one of them belongs to intR+.
Note that thanks to (S3) one has that T > 0 for any feasible production profile
(x1, x2, . . . , xl) ∈ Rl
and hence the second term in (10) (representing the revenue) is well-defined.
By virtue of [14, Lemmas 12.1 and 12.2] we conclude that, with Fi and qi given by (10) and (11),
respectively, and B = B1 × B2, the assumptions of Proposition 1 are fulfilled. This means in particular that
for all vectors (a1, a2, . . . , ai) ∈ A1×A2× . . .×Al the respective mapping S : (p1, p2) 7→ x has a single-valued
and Lipschitzian localization around any triple (p1, p2, x), where (p1, p2) ∈ B1×B2 and x ∈ S(p1, p2). Under
the posed assumptions, however, a stronger statement can be established.
Theorem 2 Let a ∈ A1 ×A2 × . . .×Al. Under the posed assumptions (S1)-(S3) the solution mapping S is
single-valued and Lipschitzian over B1 × B2.
Proof Given the vectors ai, i = 1, 2, . . . , l, and the parameters p1, p2, the GE in (3) attains the form
0 ∈
∇x1c1(p1, x1)− x1∇x1pi(p2, T )− pi(p2, T )...
∇xlcl(p1, xl)− xl∇xlpi(p2, T )− pi(p2, T )
+
Λ1(x1 − a1)...
Λl(xl − al)

+ NA1(x1)× . . .×NAl(xl),
(12)
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where
Λi(xi − ai) =

βi if xi > ai
−βi if xi < ai
[−βiβi] otherwise.
From [14, Lemma 12.2] and [17, Proposition 12.3] it follows that for any (p1, p2) ∈ B1×B2 the first operator on
the right-hand side of (12) is strictly monotone in variable x. Moreover, the second one, as the subdifferential
of a proper convex function is monotone ([17, Theorem 12.17]). Their sum is strictly monotone by virtue
of [17, Exercise 12.4(c)] and so we may recall [17, Example 12.48] according to which S(p1, p2) can have no
more than one element for any (p1, p2) ∈ B1 × B2. This, combined with Theorem 1 and the Lipschitzian
stability of S mentioned above proves the result. 
In the next section we will be dealing with the mapping Z : R ⇒ Rl−1 which, for given fixed values of
a, p1 and p2, assigns each vector x1 ∈ A1 a solution (x2, . . . , xl) of the GE
0 ∈
∇x2c2(p1, x2)− 〈x2∇x2pi(p2, T )〉 − pi(p2, T )...
∇xlcl(p1, xl)− 〈xl∇xlpi(p2, T )〉 − pi(p2, T )
+
Λ2(x2 − a2)...
Λl(xl − al)

+ NA2(x2)× . . .×NAl(xl).
(13)
Variable x1 enters GE (13) via T (=
l∑
i=1
xi). Using the same argumentation as in Theorem 2 we obtain the
following result.
Theorem 3 Let ai ∈ Ai for i = 1, 2, . . . , l, p1 ∈ B1 and p2 ∈ B2. Then, under the assumptions of Theorem
2, mapping Z is single-valued and Lipschitzian over A1.
This statement enables us to consider the situation when the first producer decides to replace the non-
cooperative by the Stackelberg strategy, cf. [11, page 220]. In this case, to maximize his profit, he has, for
given values of a, p1 and p2, to solve the MPEC
minimize c1(p1, x1)− 〈x1, pi(p2, T )〉+ β1|x1 − a1|
x1
subject to
x−1 = Z(x1)
x1 ∈ A1.
(14)
Thanks to Theorem 3 problem (14) can be replaced by the (nonsmooth) minimization problem
minimize Θ(x1)
subject to
x1 ∈ A1
(15)
in variable x1. In (15), Θ : R→ R is the composition defined by
Θ(x1) = cl(p1, xl)− 〈xl, pi(p2, x1 + L(Z(x1)))〉+ β1|x1 − a1|, (16)
where the mapping L : Rl−1 → R is defined by
L(x2, x3, . . . , xl) =
l∑
i=2
xi.
Problem (15) is thus a minimization of a locally Lipschitzian function to which various numerical approaches
can be applied.
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Fig. 2 The inverse demand function pi = pi(γ, T ) with γ = 1 (left) and production cost functions ci = ci(xi), i = 1, . . . , 5, for
t = 1 (right).
5 Numerical experiments
We consider an example from [14, Section 12.1] enhanced by a nonsmooth term reflecting the cost of change.
We have five firms (i.e., l = 5) supplying production quantities (productions)
x1, x2, . . . , x5
of one (i.e., n = 1) homogeneous commodity to a common market with the inverse demand function
pi(γ, T ) = 50001/γT−1/γ ,
where γ is a positive parameter termed demand elasticity. In our tests, however, this parameter will be fixed
(γ = 1). The resulting inverse demand function is depicted in Figure 2 (left). The production cost functions
have the form
ci(bi, xi) = bixi +
δi
δi + 1
Ki
−1/δix(1+δi)/δii ,
where bi, δi,Ki, i = 1, . . . , 5, are positive parameters. For brevity we assume that only the parameters bi,
reflecting the impact of the input prices on the production costs, evolve in time, whereas parameters δi,Ki
attain the same constant values as in [14, Table 12.1]. The cost of change will arise only at the Firms 1, 2
and 3 with different multiplicative constants
β1 = 0.5, β2 = 1, β3 = 2.
At the remaining firms any change of production does not incure additional costs (β4 = β5 = 0). We will
study the behaviour of the market over three time intervals, t ∈ {1, 2, 3} with the initial productions (at
t = 0)
a1 = 47.81, a2 = 51.14, a3 = 51.32, a4 = 48.55, a5 = 43.48,
corresponding to the standard Cournot-Nash equilibrium with the parameters taken over from [13].
The evolution of parameters bi is displayed in Table 1 and the production cost functions for t = 1 are
depicted in Figure 2 (right).
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i 1 2 3 4 5
t=1 bi 9 7 3 4 2
t=2 bi 10 8 5 4 2
t=3 bi 11 9 8 4 2
Table 1 Time dependent input parameters for the production costs.
i 1 2 3 4 5
t=0 ai 47.81 51.14 51.32 48.55 43.48
t=1 xi 49.41 51.14 54.24 48.05 43.09
−Ji 377.23 (-0.80) 459.95 639.95 (-5.83) 503.44 507.09
t=2 xi 49.41 51.14 54.24 48.05 43.09
−Ji 328.62 408.81 537.30 503.44 507.09
t=3 xi 45.71 51.14 51.58 48.76 43.64
−Ji 286.75 (-1.85) 379.76 386.92 (-5.31) 527.22 527.81
Table 2 Cournot-Nash equilibria.
i 1 2 3 4 5
t=0 ai 47.81 51.14 51.32 48.55 43.48
t=1 xi 54.95 51.14 53.59 47.52 42.68
−Ji 380.49 (-3.57) 443.52 619.80 (-4.54) 486.00 491.88
t=2 xi 53.09 51.14 53.59 47.72 42.84
−Ji 329.49 (-0.93) 398.58 523.65 492.55 497.60
t=3 xi 53.05 50.46 50.77 48.11 43.14
−Ji 289.65 (-0.02) 356.57 (-0.68) 364.33 (-5.64) 505.29 508.71
Table 3 Stackelberg-Cournot-Nash equilibria. Firm 1 is a leader.
5.1 Cournot-Nash equilibria
For the computation of respective Cournot-Nash equilibria we make use of a “nonsmooth” variant of the
Gauss-Seidel method described in [10, Algorithm 2]. Using the notation of Section 4, in the main step S.2
one computes the iteration xk = (xk1 , . . . , x
k
l ) via l nonsmooth (but convex) consecutive minimizations
xki ∈ arg min
xi∈Ai
fi(p, x
k
1 , . . . , x
k
i−l, xi, x
k−1
i+1 , . . . , x
k−1
l ) + qi(xi), i = 1, 2, . . . , l, (17)
where p is the given parameter and xk−1 = (xk−11 , . . . , x
k−1
l ) is the previous iteration.
A respective modification of the convergence result [10, Theorem 6.1] takes the following form.
Theorem 4 In addition to the assumptions posed in Section 4 suppose that the sequence xk converges for
k →∞ to some x∗ = (x∗1, . . . , x∗l ) ∈ Rl. Then x∗ is a Cournot-Nash equilibrium.
Proof Observe that for i = 1, 2, . . . , l the points xki fulfill the optimality condition
0 ∈ ∇xifi(p, xk1 , . . . , xki , xk−1i+l , . . . , xk−1l ) + ∂qi(xki ) +NAi(xki ).
Thus, there are elements ξki ∈ ∂qi(xki ) and ηki ∈ NAi(xki ) such that, by taking subsequences (without
relabeling) if necessary, ξki → ξ∗i , ηki → η∗i , satisfying the conditions
0 ∈ ∇xifi(p, x∗1, . . . , x∗l ) + ξ∗i + η∗i , ξ∗i ∈ ∂qi(x∗i ), η∗i ∈ NAi(x∗i ), (18)
i = 1, 2, . . . , l. This follows from the outer semicontinuity of the subdifferential mapping and from the uniform
boundedness of the subdifferentials ∂qi. Conditions (18) say that x
∗ is a Cournot-Nash equilibrium and we
are done. 
As the stopping rule we employ an approximative version of the optimality conditions (18).
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The obtained results are summarized in Table 2 and show the productions and profits (negative total
costs) of all firms at single time instances. In parentheses we display the costs of change (with negative signs)
which decrease the profits of the Firms 1, 2, 3 in case of any change of their production strategy.
Note that firms 1 and 3 increased significantly their productions in time 1 and decreased them in time
3, whereas Firm 2, due to the cost of change, kept its production unchanged during the whole time.
Figure 3 shows the total cost functions Ji at time 1. Note that the equilibrium production of Firm 2 lies
in a kink point because its cost of change is zero. Expectantly, functions Ji are smooth for i = 4, 5.
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Fig. 3 The total cost functions and Cournot-Nash equilibria for t=1.
5.2 Stackelberg-Cournot-Nash equilibria
Next we will consider the same market as in the previous section where, however, the first producer decides
now to replace the non-cooperative by the Stackeberg strategy. This leads to the minimization of Θ over A1,
cf. [14, page 220]. MPEC (14) is, however, more complicated than the MPECs solved with this approach in
[14] because the presence of costs of change makes the lower-level equilibrium much more difficult and the
objective is not continuously differentiable.
On the other hand, since n = 1, we may use for the minimization of Θ any suitable routine for nonsmooth
constrained univariate minimization and the same routice may be used inside the Gass-Seidel method for
the solution of the ”lower-level” problem, needed in the computations of the values of Θ. To this aim we
used an inbuilt Matlab function fminbnd ([3]).
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Remark 2 Numerical results of both subsections 5.1, 5.2 were generated by own Matlab code available freely
for downloading and testing at:
https: // www. mathworks. com/ matlabcentral/ fileexchange/ 72771 .
The code is flexible and allows for easy modifications to different models.
The obtained results are summarized in Table 3. They are quite different from their counterparts in Table
2 and show that, switching to the Stackelberg strategy, Firm 1 substantially improves its profit. In contrast
to the noncooperative strategy, it has now to change its production at each time step and also Firm 2, who
preserved in the Cournot-Nash case the same production over the whole time, is now forced to change it at
t = 2. Of course, our data are purely academic and can hardly be used for some economic interpretations.
On the other hand, the results are sound and show the potential of the suggested techniques to be applied
also in some more realistic situations.
Conclusion
In the first half of the paper we have studied a parametrized variational inequality of the second kind. In
this form, one can write down, for example, a condition which characterizes solutions of some parameter-
dependent Nash equilibrium problems. By using standard tools of variational analysis sufficient conditions
have been derived ensuring the existence of a single-valued and Lipschitzian localization of the respective
solution mapping. Apart from post-optimal analysis, the obtained results can be used in computation of
respective equilibria for given values of the parameter via continuation ([1]) or Newton-type methods ([9]).
The second part of the paper has been inspired, on one hand, by the successful theory of rate-independence
processes ([12],[7]) and, on the other hand, by the important economic paper [6]. It turns out that in some
market models the cost of change of the production strategy can be viewed as the economic counterpart of
the dissipation energy, arising in rate independent dissipative models of nonlinear mechanics of solids. Cost
of change (dissipation energy) occurs further, e.g., in modeling the behavior of some national banks who
try to regulate the inflation rate, among other instruments, via buying or selling suitable amounts of the
domestic currency on international financial markets [18].
The considered market model, obtained by augmenting the cost of change to a standard model from [13]
possesses very strong stability properties and is amenable to various numerical approaches. Both in the case
of the Cournot-Nash equilibrium as well as in the two-level (Stackelberg) case we have used rather simple
techniques based on the ”nonsmooth” line search from [3]. In case of multiple commodities and/or more
complicated costs of change one could employ more sophisticated approaches based either on the second-
order subdifferentials or on the second subderivatives discussed in Section 3. This will be the subject of our
future work.
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